Duquesne Law Review
Volume 19

Number 2

Article 4

1981

The "Surety" and Article 3: A New Identity for an Old Friend
Raymond A. Noble

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Raymond A. Noble, The "Surety" and Article 3: A New Identity for an Old Friend, 19 Duq. L. Rev. 245 (1981).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol19/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

The "Surety" and Article 3:
A New Identity for an Old Friend?
Raymond A. Noble
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sections 3-415, 3-416, and 3-606 of the Uniform- Commercial Code
("UCC" or "Code") have engendered considerable scholarly criticism
because of their lack of clarity and specificity.' One source of uncertainty results from doubt concerning the role that suretyship law is intended to play in the application of these sections. Notwithstanding a
widespread assumption that they pertain to "sureties,"' the sections
EDITOR'S NOTE: The author is presently Assistant Professor of Law, Bernard M.
Baruch College of City University of New York. B.A., St. Peter's College (1966); J.D.,
Boston College (1969).
1. See, e.g., Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
77 YALE L.J. 833, 876-79 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Peters]. Besides describing these provisions as "puzzling" and "inconclusive," the author observes: "The draftsmen's unmistakable intention to strengthen the institution of suretyship ... is considerably diluted
in effect by the Article's failure to spell out operative guidelines for determining the
liability of the potential surety." Id. at 877. See also Martin, Some Suggestions for
Nonurgent Reforms in the UCC's Treatment of Accommodation Parties, 6 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 596, 596 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Martin], where the author states: "Anyone who
has studied ... Sections 3-415, 3-416, and 3-606-knows a certain amount of despair at trying to decipher the meaning of these provisions." Id.
2. See, e.g., FDIC v. Webb, 464 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Common Wealth Ins.
Sys., Inc. v. Kersten, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 115 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1974); City Serv. Oil Co. v.
Collins, 121 Ga. App. 38, 172 S.E.2d 653 (1970); Wohlhuter v. St. Charles Lumber & Fuel
Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 812, 323 N.E.2d 134 (1975); South Side Bank & Trust Co. v. Yorke, 15
Ill. App. 3d 948, 305 N.E.2d 367 (1973); L.H. Wagener, Inc. v. Kendall, 278 N.W.2d 18
(Iowa 1979); E'Town Shopping Center, Inc. v. Lexington Fin. Co., 436 S.W.2d 267 (Ky.
1969); Rose v. Homsey, 347 Mass. 259, 197 N.E.2d 603 (1964) (dicta in case decided under
pre-Code law); LeRoy v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 277 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 1979); Langeveld v.
L.R.Z.H. Corp., 74 N.J. 45, 376 A.2d 931 (1977); Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Karlen,
28 N.Y.2d 30, 268 N.E.2d 632 (1971); Artistic Greetings, Inc. v. Sholom Greeting Card Co.,
36 A.D.2d 68, 318 N.Y.S.2d 623 (App. Div. 1971); King v. Finnell, 603 P.2d 754 (Okla. 1979);
Vinick v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 531 P.2d 327 (Okla. 1974); Philco Fin. Co. v, Patton, 248 Or.
310, 432 P.2d 686 (1967); Philadelphia Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Highland Crest Homes,
Inc., 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 252, 340 A.2d 476 (1975); Commerce Union Bank v. Davis, 581
S.W.2d 142 (Tenn. App. 1978); Commerce Union Bank v. May, 503 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn.
1973); Hooper v. Ryan, 581 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Warren v. Washington Trust
Bank, 19 Wash. App. 348, 575 P.2d 1077 (1978), affd, 92 Wash. 381, 598 P.2d 701 (1979);
Lange v. Valencia, 533 P.2d 304 (Wyo. 1975). See Clark, Suretyship in the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 TEx. L. REv. 453 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Clark]. See generally
Peters, note 1 supra.
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nonetheless evidence a total absence of suretyship terminology.' For
example, section 3-606 states certain grounds upon which parties may
be discharged from liability on the instrument. Although this section is
often characterized as the most important "surety" provision in Article
3,4 the applicability of suretyship principles cannot readily be discerned
from the statutory language.
This article examines these sections of Article 3 to determine
whether they pertain to the common law surety. In doing so, it will be
necessary to examine the meaning in section 3-606 of "any party to the
instrument ... [with a] right of recourse,"5 and to consider the nature

of "accommodation parties" under section 3-4151 and of "guarantors"
3. The only place where suretyship terminology appears in the text of Article 3 is in
3-802(2) which states that acceptance of a check does not automatically "diicharge a
surety." U.C.C. § 3-802(2).
4. See Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 74 N.J. 45, 50, 376 A.2d 931, 934 (1977), and law
review articles cited therein.
5. Section 3-606 reads in its entirety as follows:
Impairment of Recourse or of Collateral
(1) The holder discharges any part to the instrument to the extent that
without such party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of
recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person the
instrument or collateral or otherwise discharges such person, except that
failure or delay in effecting any required presentment, protest or notice of
dishonor with respect to any such person does not discharge any party as
to whom presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf
of the party or any person against whom he has a right of recourse.
(2) By express reservation of rights against a party with a right of recourse
the holder preserves
(a) all his rights against such party as of the time when the instrument was
originally due; and
(b) the right of the party to pay the instrument as of that time; and
(c) all rights of such party to recourse against others.
U.C.C. § 3-606.
6. Section 3-415 states:
Contract of Accommodation Party
(1) An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity
for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it.
(2) When the instrument has been taken for value before it is due the accommodation party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed even though
the taker knows of the accommodation.
(3) As against a holder in due course and without notice of the accommodation
oral proof of the accommodation is not admissible to give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such. In
other cases the accommodation character may be shown by oral proof.
(4) An indorsement which shows that it is not in the chain of title is notice of
its accommodation character.
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under section 3-416.1
This article cannot accomplish its purpose, however, merely by
resorting to abstract analysis of the draftsmen's original intent. A
quarter century has passed since the Code was first enacted8 and the
relevant provisions are now law in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands? Only through careful analysis of the
relevant cases as well as the statutory language can one expect to
(5) An accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated, and if he
pays the instrument has a right of recourse on the instrument against such
party.

Id § 3-415.
New York adds subsection (6) as follows:
(6) An accommodation party warrants to any subsequent holder who is not the
party accommodated and who takes the instrument in good faith that
(a) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(b) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
(c) all prior parties had capacity to contract; and
(d) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with respect to the maker or acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted
instrument.
N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-415(6) (McKinney 1964).
7. Section 3-416 reads in its entirety as follows:
Contract of Guarantor
(1) "Payment guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that
the signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay
it according to its tenor without resort by the holder to any other party.
(2) "Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean
that the signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will
pay it according to its tenor, but only after the holder has reduced his claim
against the maker or acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned
unsatisfied, or after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is
otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against him.
(3) Words of guaranty which do not otherwise specify guarantee payment.
(4) No words of guaranty added to the signature of a sole maker or acceptor affect his liability on the instrument. Such words added to the signature of
one of two or more makers or acceptors create a presumption that the
signature is for the accommodation of the others.
(5) When words of guaranty are used presentment, notice of dishonor and protest are not necessary to charge the user.
(6) Any guaranty written on the instrument is enforcible notwithstanding any
statute of frauds.
U.C.C. § 3-416.
8. The first draft of the Code was enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953. A revised Code
was later drafted in response to initial criticism; it was first enacted by Massachusetts in
1957 and many other states followed promptly thereafter. See Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report No. 1 (Oct. 31, 1962), reprinted in 1 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED xxv (Master ed. 1976).
9. While the Code in its entirety has been adopted in 49 states, Article 3 has been
adopted in Louisiana. See 1 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED xxxvii, 1-2 (Master ed. 1976 &
Supp. 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:3-101 to -807 (West Supp. 1980).
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reach reliable and practical conclusions as to which parties may expect
to benefit from these so-called surety provisions.
II.

WHO IS A "SURETY"

UNDER ARTICLE 3?

Section 3-606 is one of a number of discharge provisions in the
UCC.1 It states that a holder, under certain circumstances, discharges
a party by: (1) releasing or agreeing not to sue another person against
whom the party being discharged has, to the holder's knowledge, a
right of recourse (provided that the party seeking discharge did not
consent to the holder's conduct);" (2) agreeing to suspend the right to
enforce the instrument or collateral against that other person; and (3)
"otherwise" discharging such person.'2 The last mentioned provision
refers to those grounds set forth in other sections of the Code. 3 The
first two references deal with grounds contained only in this section
and which were available only to sureties at common law. 4 These
grounds have generally been known as "surety defenses.""5
A.

The Meaning of "Any Party to the Instrument". Does It Include
the Sole, Nonaccommodation Maker?

The opening reference in section 3-606 to "any party to the instrument" makes it appear that the section discharges all parties to in10. The grounds for discharge stated in Article 3 are set forth in § 3-601(1), which
contains cross-references to the appropriate Code sections.
11. U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(a). This reference applies to absolute releases, Provident Bank v.
Gast, 57 Ohio St. 2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1357 (1979); and to grants of an extension of time to
the party against whom recourse could have been sought, United Counties Trust Co. v.
Podvey, 160 N.J. Super. 244, 389 A.2d 515 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). Mere delay is not a
basis of discharge in the absence of an agreement to extend time. Mechanics Nat'l Bank v.
Shear, 79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 477, 386 N.E.2d 1299 (1979). The "agreement" apparently need not be legally binding, so long as the parties, in fact, agreed, Lee Federal Credit
Union v. Gussie, 542 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1976). Contra, Glover v. National Bank of Commerce, 258 Ark. 771, 529 S.W.2d 333 (1975). Since extending the time of payment for the
principal debtor would generally seem to be beneficial to the party with a right of
recourse as well, the rule can be criticized where no actual prejudice is shown. See
Hilpert, Discharge of Latent Sureties on Negotiable Instruments Because of Release or
Extension of Time, 50 YALE L.J. 387, 399 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Hilpert].
12. U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(a). Discharge under § 3-606 is limited "to the extent" of actual injury. This limitation is most likely to be relevant in situations where collateral is partially
impaired, id § 3-606(1)(b); see, e.g., Key Credit Corp. v. Young, 124 Ill.
App. 2d 309, 260
N.E.2d 488 (1970); Christensen v. McAtee, 256 Or. 333, 473 P.2d 659 (1970). Questions of
such pro tanto discharge are less likely to occur in cases involving time extensions and
releases since, where these occur, they are not usually limited to only part of the obligation.
13. See U.C.C. § 3-601(3)(b).
14. See W. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 292 (2d ed. 1961).
15. For a discussion of difficulties which arise from the identification of these
grounds for discharge as "defenses," see Hilpert, supra note 11, at 405.
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struments without exception. Such a reading might find some support
in Rushton v. U. M. & M. Credit Corp.18 There the Supreme Court of
Arkansas stated that a party "would not have to be an accommodation
endorser to seek relief under § 85-3-606 because 'any party to the instrument' as used therein is broad enough to include all makers and
endorsers."' 7 The party claiming discharge in Rushton was an indorser
and the court's statement was in response to the question of whether
the indorser was an accommodation party. Despite the conclusion that
a nonaccommodation indorser can be entitled to discharge under section 3-606, the court went on, however, to hold that no discharge had
actually occurred. The court found that the indorser's claim of impairment of collateral under section 3-606(1)(b) was without merit on the
facts of the case.
The court's conclusion in Rushton that section 3-606 is available to
anyone who is party to the instrument is mere dictum. Moreover, to
the extent that it implies that a sole, nonaccommodation maker, for example, is entitled to discharge under the section, it is demonstrably
wrong. Only a party who has a "right of recourse" can claim such
discharge, and this is so regardless of whether the claim is based on
release, extension of time,18 or impairment of collateral. 9 On the other
hand, the holder can release the principal debtor or extend his time for
payment without discharging the party having a right of recourse by
means of an express reservation of rights.0 He thereby also preserves
the other's "right of recourse" as well."
Whatever "right of recourse" means, it cannot conceivably apply to
a maker who is both the sole, primary obligor on the instrument and
the principal debtor as well.' Such a party would have no right of any
kind against any third party to the instrument.
In Oregon Bank v. Baardson' the Supreme Court of Oregon
16. 245 Ark. 703, 434 S.W.2d 81 (1968).
17. Id. at 707, 434 S.W.2d at 83.
18. U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(a).
19. Id. § 3-606(1}(b).
20. Id. § 3-606(1)(a). There is no similar provision for avoiding discharge by express
reservation of rights in the case of unjustifiable impairment of collateral. See id. §
3-606(1}(b). See also Martin, supra note 1, at 616. But see Murray, Accommodation Parties: A Potpourriof Problems, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 814, 826 (1968).
21. U.C.C. § 3-606(2)(c).
22. As we use these terms, the primary obligor is a maker or an acceptor who, by
reason of the capacity in which he signs, engages to pay the instrument according to its
tenor without benefit of prior presentment, notice of dishonor, or protest. U.C.C. §§
3-413(1), -501. A principal debtor, by contrast, is the party for whose benefit the debt is
being incurred and who, as between himself and a party who signs for his benefit, is liable
to pay regardless of the capacity in which he signed the instrument. See, e.g., id. §
3-415(5).
23. 256 Or. 454, 473 P.2d 1015 (1970).
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recognized that no one can be discharged under section 3-606 unless he
has a right of recourse. There, the principal debtor persuaded a friend
to join him on notes as a co-maker so as to enable the principal debtor
to borrow money from a bank. He promised the co-maker, in return,
that he would assume sole responsibility for payment of the notes,
whereupon the co-maker gave a mortgage on specified equipment as
collateral for the loan. The bank later released this collateral to the comaker. When the bank sued the principal debtor for payment, the
defense was raised that the bank's release of collateral discharged him
under section 3-606.
The court held that no discharge had occurred, however, since one
claiming discharge by reason of impairment of collateral must always
have a right of recourse against some other party. The court reasoned
that the principal debtor clearly was liable to pay his own debt and
could not pass off any part of this responsibility to his co-maker. If the
defendant paid the instrument, he would have had no recourse against
the co-maker's collateral.
The reasoning of the court is unquestionably correct. The friend was
an accommodation party and, as such, was not liable to the principal
debtor he had accommodated. 4
B.

The Meaning of "Right" of Recourse

A closer analysis of the concept of discharge under section 3-606 cannot be accomplished without ascertaining the meaning of "right of
recourse." Considering that this term is the sole criterion for
discharge, it is surprising that no detailed study of the term exists,
either in text or in case law.
"Recourse" is a term with a long history in the law of negotiable instruments. Unfortunately, it was traditionally used to describe rights
of a holder rather than those of parties seeking discharge by reason of
the holder's conduct. One eighteenth century source, for example, uses
the term in a discussion of preconditions which must be met before the
holder of a bill of exchange could obtain "recourse" against a drawer.'
Used in this sense, recourse describes the holder's right to recover
payment from parties who are secondarily liable, i.e., drawers and indorsers, after the maker or acceptor has failed to meet the obligation.
The Code continues to use the term in this sense when it permits a
qualified indorser to avoid liability by indorsing the instrument
24. See U.C.C. § 3-415(1), (5). We shall see that the result could be different, however,
if the party claiming discharge had not been an accommodated maker and had a right of
contribution against the co-maker. See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
25. See, e.g., The Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session 401 (Scotland
1747).
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"without recourse"; ie., such indorsement deprives the holder of his
customary "recourse" which might otherwise arise against the indorser.26
While this traditional use of "recourse" is not precisely on point in
explaining the term as used in section 3-606, it is general authority for
the broad but simple proposition that a right of recourse is a right of
one party to an instrument to obtain payment from someone else. In
the absence of any limiting provisions, it is believed that the draftsmen intended to use the term in this broad, general sense. This interpretation also would be in accord with the common, nontechnical meaning of "recourse.' While it is normally the holder who seeks recourse
on an instrument," the party from whom he obtains payment may be
entitled, in turn, to demand all or part of that payment from someone
else. "Any party to the instrument"29 who would possess any such
right to payment from another after he himself has been called upon to
pay the holder would, therefore, appear to be entitled to discharge provided that he meets the conditions stated in section 3-606.
C.

The Meaning of "Surety" in the Official Comments

Rather than defining which parties have a "right of recourse," most
interpretations of section 3-606 have been satisfied to assume that the
parties discharged under this section are sureties, apparently in the
traditional sense of that word." A strong case can be marshaled to support this conclusion. The grounds for discharge stated in section 3-606
are those which traditionally belonged to common-law sureties."
Moreover, the official comments to the Code, unlike the statutory text,
make clear reference to suretyship. The most important of these
references is contained in a comment to section 3-606:
The suretyship defenses here provided are not limited to parties who are
"secondarily liable," but are available to any party who is in the position

of a surety, having a right of recourse either on the instrument or dehors
it, including an accommodation maker or acceptor known to the holder to be

With reference to section 3-415, the comments also state that: "[A]n accommodation party is always a surety (which includes a guarantor), and it is
26. U.C.C. § 3-414(1).
27. See, e.g., Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d
ed. 1959) (unabridged), wherein "recourse" is defined as: "Resort or application for
assistance: resort (to a person) for the meeting of an obligation."

28. U.C.C. § 3-301.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
See cases cited at note 1 supra.
See note 14 supra.
U.C.C. § 3-606 comment 1 (emphasis supplied).
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his only distinguishing feature. He differs from other sureties only in that
his 33liability is on the instrument and he is a surety for another party to
it.
A further comment to section 3-415 goes on to state: "Under ordinary principles of suretyship the accommodation party who pays is
subrogated to the rights of the holder paid, and should have his
recourse on the instrument."'
These comments 35 provide ample evidence that some fundamental
nexus exists between section 3-415, section 3-606, and the common law
of suretyship. Unfortunately, the Code does not define "surety," apart
from these comments, other than to say that the term also "includes
guarantor.136 Assuming that the Code provides no definition of its own
of surety, it may be suggested that the common law of suretyship
should be consulted to provide such a definition.3" In support of this
view, it can be noted that: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions [of the Code]... the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions."'
Despite this ovewhelming evidence that the sections in question are
interrelated with classic suretyship, there are important and disturbing counter-indications as well, at least insofar as the identity of the
surety is concerned. The first of these arises from the very fact that
surety terminology is absent from the statutory text of all three of the
key Article 3 provisions previously mentioned. 9 Though the draftsmen
could have utilized such familiar suretyship terminology, they instead
chose to use the less familiar reference to "any party" with a "right of
recourse." This is cause for wonder: reference to the lesser-known
term rather than the more established one seems to undermine the
draftsmen's stated purpose of avoiding "abstractions" in favor of
"words . . . of a tangible character."4 It certainly would seem likely,
then, that the draftsmen would have used the suretyship terminology
if it had suited their meaning.
A review of legislative history reveals other evidence showing that the
absence of suretyship references in the statute was not inadvertent but
33. Id. § 3-415 comment 1.
34. Id. § 3-415 comment 5.
35. Other relevant comments relating to sureties are comments 2 and 4 of § 3-415
and comments 3 and 4 of § 3-606.
36. U.C.C. § 1-201(40). See id. § 3-416.
37. See Note, Suretyship Law and Negotiable Instruments Lab: The Liability of an
Accommodation Party to a Negotiable Instrument in Louisiana, 24 LOY. L. REV. 251, 259
(1979). See generally Clark, note 2 supra.
38. U.C.C. § 1-103.
39. See text accompanying note 1 supra.

40. U.C.C. § 2-101 comment.
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purposeful. The first official draft of the Code in 1952 expressly referred
to the accommodation parties as "sureties."" In 1955, when the Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code made its recommendations for
revisions, they determined that this reference to suretyship was not
appropriate. 2 It is not clear, unfortunately, what reasons existed to
warrant that conclusion. In any event, when a revised draft was
adopted in 1956, the suretyship reference had been deleted.43
There is one remaining reference to sureties in Article 3, which is
found in section 3-802."' In view of all we have seen, that suretyship
reference seems inexplicable unless, as has been suggested, its continued presence is a mere anachronism.4' The fact that the draftsmen
deliberately avoided referring to sureties in the statutory language
should give us pause, at the very least, before we rush to identify parties with recourse under Article 3 with the common-law surety.
Finally, the suretyship references in the comments must be kept in
perspective. The official comments have not been adopted by the
legislature of any jurisdiction and, consequently, are not legally binding.' 6
It can also be argued that the statutory references to "any party [with a]
right of recourse" operate to "displace" common law tests of suretyship.4'
It might be concluded, therefore, that the comments should not be permitted to alter the statutory meaning. Nonetheless, the official comments provide important insight into legislative intention and it is
desirable to see whether these references to sureties in the comments
can be harmonized with the obvious implications to be drawn both
from the draftsmen's avoidance of suretyship references in the
statutory text and from their deliberate use of a substitute term.
It is submitted that such harmonization is most possible. The same
official comments which refer to suretyship indicate that the sole
criteria to be used in identifying the surety is the existence of a "right
of recourse"; ie., "The suretyship defenses here provided . . . are
41. I& § 3-415(1) (1952 Official Draft) stated: "An accommodation party is one who
signs the instrument in any capacity as a surety for another party to it." (emphasis supplied). This generally continued the language of the prior, unofficial drafts. See U.C.C. §
3-424 (May, 1949 Draft).
42. American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissions on Uniform
State Laws, 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code 113 (1957).
43. U.C.C. § 3-415(1) (1956 Official Draft).
44. U.C.C. § 3-802(2) states: "The taking in good faith of a check which is not
postdated does not of itself so extend the time on the original obligation as to discharge a
surety."
45. Peters, supra note 1, at 837 n.17.
46.

J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

12 (1980).
47. See U.C.C. § 1-103.

CODE
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available to any party who is in the position of a surety, having a right
of recourse either on the instrument or dehors it .... ,, Understood as
a definition, then, this comment accords perfectly with our construction of the statutory language itself,49 namely, that a surety is deemed
to be anyone with a right of recourse. Although the comments invoke
common law to determine the nature and extent of the surety
defenses, when it comes to identifying who these "sureties" are within
the context of Article 3, they refer us back to the statutory test of
whether a party has a right of recourse. If such right exists, the party
must be accorded the benefit of surety defenses under section 3-606.
D. Does Article 3 Change the Common Law Definition of "'Surety"?
Under the common law, suretyship is often defined as a relationship
arising out of an agreement whereby one party "engages to be
50
answerable for the debt or default of another.
Much of the superficial clarity of this definition fades, however,
when applied to negotiable instruments.
Suppose, for example, that A is persuaded by B to sign a note so
that B can borrow money from C (the usual reason is that C would not
have loaned the money based solely on B's credit). If B signs the note
as well, A becomes an accommodation party.5 If he signed in the capacity of a maker, however, A would also be primarily liable to the holder
on the instrument.52 If called upon to pay C, A would then have a
"right of recourse" against B.53 This would entitle A to assert surety
defenses if, for example, C, without A's consent, discharged B from
liability despite knowing of A's accommodation status and without an express reservation of rights. The comments make clear that the accommodation party is "always a surety" under section 3-606, even when
he has signed as a maker. The Code finds no inconsistency between
A's duty as a primary obligor and his rights as a surety and this has
been generally recognized by the courts where an accommodation maker
is concerned. 5
48. Id § 3-606 comment 1 (emphasis supplied). See also note 32 and accompanying
text supra, wherein the same comment has been given different emphasis.
49. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
50. A. STEARNS, LAW OF SURETYSHIP 1 (5th rev. ed. J. Elder 1951).
51. U.C.C. § 3-415(1).
52. Id. §§ 3-413(1), 3-415(1).
53. Id. § 3-415(5).
54. Id. § 3-606(1)(a).
55. See Magnolia Homes Mfg. Corp. v. Montgomery, 451 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1971); Key
Credit Corp. v. Young, 124 Ill. App. 2d 309, 260 N.E.2d 488 (1970); Kratovil v. Thieda, 36

Ill. 2d 247, 222 N.E.2d 485 (1966) (dictum); Rose v. Homsey, 347 Mass. 259, 197 N.E.2d 603
(1964) (dictum); United Counties Trust Co. v. Podvey, 160 N.J. Super. 244, 389 A.2d 515
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Security Nat'l Bank v. Temarantz, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Marshall, 551 P.2d 315 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
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But if common-law suretyship arises only when one becomes
answerable for the debt "of another," 56 it could be argued that A is not
a surety: having signed as the primary obligor on the instrument, he
can be said to have made the debt his own insofar as C was concerned.
Before enactment of the Code, much controversy raged concerning this
question of whether an accommodation maker may assert surety
defenses.' 7 While there is evidence that older cases at common law
often granted him such right,58 the Uniform Negotiable Instrument
Law (UNIL) which preceded the Code was generally construed to
preclude him from asserting such defenses." While the original reason
for the UNIL position may have been based on other policy grounds,"0
it later came to be widely assumed that the reason for excluding
primary obligors was based on the fact that the maker's role, as one
which is primary and direct, is incompatible with surety status."
Therefore, it has been observed that, apart from the UCC, "[tihe promise of a surety is functionally secondary or accessorial; it backstops the
6'2
debt of another."
This perceived incompatibility between status as a primary obligor
and as a surety may explain the peculiar position taken by Maryland
regarding a primary obligor's surety status under the Code. This was
initially evidenced in Etelson v. Suburban Trust Co.,' in which surety
defenses were invoked by indorsers who had guaranteed payment. The
court properly held that the indorsers had waived their right to plead
any defense of impairment of collateral by reason of having consented
to release of the collateral under the terms of the note. Toward the
end of the decision, however, the court went on to state another
reason for denying such defenses: "In fact, as guarantors of 'payment'
of the loan their liability is indistinguishable from that of a co-maker. '' "
56. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
57. This was an important subject included in the famous Ames-Brewster controversy. For a summary of this dispute see McKeehan, The Negotiable Instrument Law, 50
AM. L. REG. 437 (1902). See generally Hilpert, note 11 supra.
58. See, e.g., Phelps v. Boland, 103 N.Y. 406, 9 N.E. 307 (1886).
59.

See UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW

§

120. (The Uniform Negotiable In-

strument Law was withdrawn upon adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.) See also
Rose v. Homsey, 347 Mass. 259, 197 N.E.2d 603 (1964), which noted in dicta that the result
would be different under the U.C.C.
60. See Note, Discharge of Sureties-Impairment of the Right of Recourse, 9 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 970, 973 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Discharge of Sureties].
61. See Common Wealth Ins. Sys., Inc. v. Kersten, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1029, 115
Cal. Rptr. 653, 663 (1974); Wohlhuter v. St. Charles Lumber & Fuel Co., 25 Ill.
App. 3d
812, 816, 323 N.E.2d 134, 137, affd, 62 Il.2d 16, 338 N.E.2d 179 (1975); Commerce Union
Bank v. May, 503 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Tenn. 1973); Hooper v. Ryan, 581 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Peoples Bank v. Pied Piper Retreat, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 573 (W. Va. 1974).
62. Clark, supra note 2, at 455.
63. 263 Md. 376, 283 A.2d 408 (1971).
64. 1& at 380, 283 A.2d at 411.
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The only authority cited by the court was the comment to section
3-416 which states that an indorser who guarantees payment waives
not only "presentment, notice of dishonor and protest, but also all demand upon the maker or drawee. Words of guaranty do not affect the
character of the indorsement as an indorsement (Section 3-202(4)); but
the liability of the indorser becomes indistinguishable from that of a
co-maker."'65 While the court was correct in stating that all payment
guarantors are liable as though they were primary obligors, this in no
way should deprive these guarantors of surety defenses. As previously
noted, those defenses are available under the Code to any party with a
right of recourse, including primary obligors such as accommodation
makers.66
The Code does not directly state that the guarantor has a right of
recourse against another the way an accommodation party does."
Nonetheless, such right is a clear corollary of the fact that, as already
noted, the guarantor is a surety within the meaning of the Code.68
It might have been possible to dismiss the statement in the Etelson
case as mere careless dicta were it not for the subsequent case of
Turfers, Inc. v. Frederick Production Credit Association.9 There the
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court decision holding that
accommodation makers were not entitled to discharge by reason of the
payee's grant of an extension of time to the principal debtor, even
though the payee knew of the accommodation. The court simply relied
on pre-Code law and refused to be swayed from its view by contrary
Code decisions in other jurisdictions. No attempt was made to explain
the explicit references in the Code comments where accommodation
makers were identified as sureties. 0
Based on these comment references, the vast majority of courts
have rejected Maryland's position and have affirmed the suretyship
rights of accommodation makers. 1 We have already noted that many
other primary obligors have no right of recourse and therefore are not
65. U.C.C. § 3-416 comment. In addition to the payment guarantor described here,
another type of guarantor, the collection guarantor, is described in § 3-416(2). He also
waives presentment, notice of dishonor, and protest but he is not primarily liable. He only
becomes liable if judgment is obtained against the primary obligor and execution has not
been satisfied or is unfeasible (as in the case of bankruptcy).
66. See note 55 supra.
67. U.C.C. § 3-416(4) does state that a co-maker who signs with words of guarantee is
presumed to be an accommodation party and entitled to defenses. As for the accommoda-

tion party's right, see id § 3-415(5).
68. Id § 1-201(40); see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
69. 265 Md. 679, 291 A.2d 643 (1972).
70. See, e.g., U.C.O. § 3-415 comment 1.
71. See, e.g., note 55 supra.
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entitled to surety defenses." If only accommodation makers, among
such primary parties, had a right of recourse, the fact that courts
might reach the proper result by resort to traditional suretyship concepts rather than by analysis of the right of recourse would be of no
more than academic interest.
Accommodation parties, however, are not the only primary obligors
who may have a right of recourse. It has long been recognized that any
co-obligor - including a nonaccommodation co-maker-has a right of
contribution once he is called upon to pay more than his share of the
debt:
If two or more persons are ... jointly and severally liable, on a note or
bill, in any way, or on any ground, or to any extent, and one or more of
them pay more than his aliquot share of the amount, the parties paying
can recover of the others who were bound to pay, their share, by way of
contribution."3
This right of contribution should be recognized as a right of recourse
under section 3-606 since it is a right of one who is called upon to pay
the instrument to look, in turn, for payment from another. While the
right of recourse of the accommodation party or guarantor would
amount to complete indemnification in contrast to the partial recovery
obtainable under a right of contribution, there is no reason in the Code
for drawing any distinction along these lines. If a surety defense arose
out of a right of contribution, of course, it should discharge the comaker to no greater extent than his right of contribution."'
This right of a nonaccommodation maker to assert surety defenses
based on a right of contribution was recognized in Beneficial Finance
75
In Beneficial Finance Co. a husband and wife signed a
Co. v. Husner.
note secured by certain collateral. The couple later separated and the
creditor permitted the wife to sell the collateral. The court stated that
the husband would have been entitled to discharge under section 3-606 to
the extent of any right of contribution because collateral was impaired
and the right of contribution is a "right of recourse" under section 3-606.
The court went on to hold, however, that the party asserting a right of
recourse has the burden of proof; since the husband failed to present any
proof regarding the existence or extent of any right of contribution in
the particular case, it was held that he was not discharged.
The case is important in that it recognizes that even a nonaccommodation, primary obligor can be entitled to surety defenses. It also
72. See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
73. T. PARSON, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES AND BILLS
CHANGE 253 (2d ed. 1875).
74. See Provident Bank v. Gast, 57 Ohio St. 2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1357 (1979).
75. 82 Misc. 2d 550, 369 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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recognized that the criteria for these defenses is the presence of a
right of recourse rather than any generalized analysis of the capacity
in which a party signed or any other analysis of whether the debt was
his or that of another party. However these questions might be
answered, it is clear that any party with a right of contribution should
be entitled to surety defenses under the Code. 8
Judicial recognition of accommodation makers as "sureties" under
section 3-606"1 does not, however, warrant optimism that the nonaccommodation co-maker will have similar success in persuading a
court that he has surety rights. Many examples can be cited to show
this even though much of this evidence, fortunately, arises from mere
dicta. In Common Wealth Insurance Systems, Inc. v. Kersten78 the
California Court of Appeals stated that the evidence supported a finding that defendants were "principals, not accommodation makers....
Not being accommodation makers, they were not entitled to suretyship
defenses.""9
The court's denial of surety defenses appears to have been correct
for other reasons since the co-makers pleading the defenses had consented to the impairment of collateral alleged to be the basis of the
alleged defense. Also, since the defendants alleged total discharge and
the defendants apparently never proved that they possessed grounds
for discharge, for example, by reason of a right of contribution, the
court's holding may be said to be in accord with Beneficial Finance Co.
v. Husner." Nonetheless, the implication in the dicta that a maker can
never be entitled to surety defenses if he is a "principal" and not an
accommodation party may cause much mischief in future cases.
A'similar assumption that a primary obligor's status is inherently inconsistent with suretyship status can be seen in Commerce Union
Bank v. May." The court in Commerce Union Bank emphasized that
comment 1 to section 3-606 speaks of "suretyship" (in citing the comment, the court actually deleted the very section of the comment which
identifies suretyship, for this purpose, with possession of a right of
recourse). 2 The court went on to state:
76. See Provident Bank v. Gast, 57 Ohio St. 2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1357 (1979), where the
court held that when one co-guarantor is released under the circumstances of § 3-606, the
release discharges the other co-guarantors to the extent of their right of contribution
from the co-guarantor who was released. Cf. Fithian v. Jamar, 286 Md. 161, 410 A.2d 569
(1979), where the right of contribution among co-sureties is discussed.
77. See note 55 supra.
78. 40 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 115 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1974).
79. Id at 1029, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
80. 82 Misc. 2d 550, 369 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
81. 503 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. 1973).
82. Id. at 116.
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In our opinion, the phrase, "any party to the instrument," is used in the
subject statute to embrace parties to the instrument in addition to
drawers and endorsers who are in the position of a known surety. In the
instant case, May, the maker, has a right of recourse against the Shelbys,
dehors the instrument, and the Bank had knowledge of the transfer. But
May is not in the position of a surety unless some provision in the subject
statute requires that his relationship to the holder be changed from principal to surety.'
We will consider whether the decision was ultimately correct when we
discuss whether the particular right of recourse "dehors the instrument" can be basis for a surety defense.' Apart from that question,
the court was clearly wrong in its conclusion that a nonaccommodation
maker cannot be a surety even if he has a right of recourse without
the meaning of the statutes.
Wohlhuter v. St. Charles Lumber & Fuel Co.85 also addressed the
question of whether a co-maker could assert surety defenses. The court
recognized that he could if he were an accommodation maker, but
stated that this was only because of a special exemption due to an accommodation party's "surety" status:
An accommodation maker's basic liability to a holder is identical to that of
any other maker. He engages to pay the note according to its tenor at the
time of signing. However, the surety status of an accommodation party
will give him special defenses (e.g., UCC 3-606) unavailable to the general
run of parties on instruments.
The court went on to state: "It appears, therefore, that at the time
defendants individually signed the promissory notes they knowingly incurred personal liability and were thus signing in the capacity of comakers."'8 As in Common Wealth Insurance88 and in Beneficial Finance
Co.,89 the co-maker appears not to have shown any right of contribution.
In Peoples Bank v. Pied Piper Retreat, Inc." nonaccommodation comakers also sought to plead surety defenses, apparently without proving any right of contribution, and the court held that they were not entitled to do so. Once again, however, the court's dicta stated that
nonaccommodation makers cannot use surety defenses because principal debtors are not "sureties":
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

I. (emphasis in original).
See note 109 and accompanying text infra.
2d 16, 338 N.E.2d 179 (1975).
App. 3d 812, 323 N.E.2d 134, aff'd, 62 Ill.
25 Ill.
Id. at 816, 323 N.E.2d at 137.
Id.
40 Cal. App. 3d at 1029, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
82 Misc. 2d 550, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
209 S.E.2d 573 (W. Va. 1974).
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The appellant concedes that this defense of unjustifiable impairment of
collateral is available only to secondary or accommodation parties. This is
undoubtedly the rule-the defense is available to both secondary accommodation parties such as accommodation endorsers, or primary accommodation parties such as accommodation makers. The defense is not
available to principal debtors, i.e., makers. See the official comment to
Code, 46-3-606, where it is indicated that this is a suretyship defense
available to a party who has recourse against another party to the instrument."
Despite the prior language, the last quoted sentence offers some basis
to distinguish the case where, for example, a right of contribution is
shown.
In Hooper v. Ryan,92 too, the court held that nonaccommodation comakers could not assert surety defenses. Ironically, the rationale on
this point immediately followed a discussion of a co-makers's right of
contribution "from the other co-maker for any excess of his prorata
[sic] that he is compelled to pay."93 The court did not mention that,
upon proof of such right of contribution, the rights of the holder also
would have been affected. In that case the evidence showed that the
holders had impaired collateral and had released a third co-maker
without an express reservation of rights against the two defendants.
The court, nonetheless, stated that, "Section 3-606 of the Uniform Com'
mercial Code applies to sureties and not to co-makers."94
We have seen how much mischief occurs when a general definition
of surety is used to identify those entitled to defenses under section
3-606. The accommodation maker's status as a surety seems to be accepted by courts only because of the Code's explicit discussion of his
right. The courts perceive his right as a special exception and they
continue to assume that other primary obligors cannot possess surety
rights under Article 3. It has also been noted, however, that the Code
does not limit suretyship to accommodation parties and guarantors but
expands the definition to include others with a right of recourse, such
as a maker with a right of contribution. 5
This leaves one other question: Is an indorser who is not an accommodation party and who has no right of contribution against a coindorser a surety under section 3-606? We saw in the Rushton case9"
that the court held that a nonaccommodation indorser is entitled to
suretyship defenses. Unfortunately, the decision was based upon that
91. Id- at 578.
92. 581 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
93. Id at 238.
94. Id The court cited Wohhuter in support of this proposition, 25 IlM.
App. 3d 812,
323 N.E.2d 134 (1975), affd, 62 IMI.
2d 16, 338 N.E.2d 179 (1975).
95. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
96. 245 Ark. 703, 434 S.W.2d 81 (1968).
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court's simplistic reasoning that section 3-606 is available to any party
to the instrument without exception. While that reasoning is rejected,
the court nonetheless seems to have been correct in holding that a
nonaccommodation indorser is entitled to surety defenses; this is
because indorsers have a right of recourse within the meaning of section 3-606.
An indorser, by contract, engages that upon dishonor and any
necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement. 1 Upon such payment, he receives the right to seek re-imbursement from prior indorsers" and from primary obligors and drawers. 9
This right to proceed against prior parties falls clearly within our
definition of a right of recourse and thereby entitles any indorser to invoke a surety defense under the conditions stated in section 3-606. The
indorser also seems to qualify, in any event, as a "surety" under the
classic definition because he also has made himself liable for the debt
"of another.'
While the indorser is not an accommodation party if, as
is usually the case, he signed in order to transfer title rather than for
the purpose of lending his name to prior parties, such intent is not
necessary to suretyship; all the indorser needs for this purpose is his
right of recourse. The indorser's right seems to be established clearly
in a comment to section 3-606: "The suretyship defense stated has been
generally recognized as available to indorsers or accommodation parties." 0'
Our discussion of the problems which have arisen when courts have
applied their own understanding of classic suretyship rather than
analyze a party's right of recourse has been undertaken to show the
possible effect on the outcome of decisions under section 3-606. It is
not meant to imply that their general view of traditional suretyship as
secondary and dependent on the debt being that of another, in any particular understanding of the term, is the only or best classic definition.
Another definition of traditional suretyship was stated in the Restatement of Security as follows: "The surety is the person who is bound on
an obligation from which another, by the discharge of a duty, should
relieve him." ' This appears to be identical with Article 3's definition if
we assume that anyone who "should" be relieved from the obligation
by another thereby has a "right" to recourse against him. It seems
probable that the draftsmen believed that classic suretyship is synon97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

U.C.C. § 3-414(1).
Id § 3-414(2).
Id §§ 3-413(1), (3).
See note 50 supra.
U.C.C. § 3-606 comment 5.
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §

82, comment a (1941).
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omous with having a right of recourse. But it also appears likely, from
the fact of their deliberate avoidance of suretyship references in the
statute, that they recognized the ambiguity of that term and sought to
avoid misunderstanding by reference to "right of recourse." The fact
that, as later case law demonstrates, this plan failed, is due to the
draftsmen's failure to define "surety" more clearly or to explain the
meaning of a "right of recourse."
E.

Must a Surety Sign the Instrument?

Thus far we have examined the widespread confusion growing out of
the use by courts of preconceived ideas about sureties, in lieu of any
analysis of a right of recourse. But another source of confusion also has
arisen and it concerns the question of whether the surety under section 3-606 must be a signatory to the negotiable instrument.
At first glance, this question would seem to be answered clearly by
the Code in the affirmative: "The holder discharges any party to the
instrument . . . .'"" The only parties to negotiable instruments under
Article 3 are those such as makers, drawers, acceptors, and indorsers
who have signed this instrument itself.0 4
Most courts have held that the party must have signed the instrument. 1 5 However, the comments refer to the surety having a "right of
recourse either on the instrument or dehors it.""' This quote has caused
confusion in the courts.
In Provident Bank v. Gast... some of the defendants had signed
guarantees on a negotiable note and others had signed a separate agreement by which they also guaranteed payment on the note. The guarantors on the note were released and the other guarantors pleaded section 3-606 by way of defense. The court held that despite the fact that
they had not signed the instrument, the separate guarantors were entitled to discharge to the extent that their right of contribution had
been undermined. The court reasoned that the separate guarantors
had a right of recourse dehors the instrument and, obviously relying
on the Code comment cited above, the court held that these guarantors
were entitled to discharge under section 3-606.
The court's reasoning, however, was wrong. The comment reference
to a right dehors the instrument is not meant to apply to non103. U.C.C. § 3-606 (emphasis added).
104. See id. §§ 3-413, -414.
105. United Planters Nat'l Bank v. Markowitz, 468 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Tenn. 1979)
(where the court justified its holding on a second ground as well); Ishak v. Eljin Nat'l
Bank, 48 Ill. App. 3d 614, 363 N.E.2d 159 (1977); National Bank v. Alford, 65 Mich. App.
634, 237 N.W.2d 592 (1975).
106. U.C.C. § 3-606 comment 1.
107. 57 Ohio St. 2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1357 (1979).
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signatories but rather to signatories whose right of recourse,
nonetheless, may not be on the instrument."8
A good example of a circumstance in which a party who has signed
the instrument might have a right of recourse dehors it can be seen in
Commerce Union Bank v. May." There a maker of a note also signed a
mortgage on real property as security for his debt. The land was later
sold to another party. The other party defaulted and, after a
foreclosure sale, the defendant was sued for the deficiency. He raised
the defense that the collateral had been impaired and that he thus had
been discharged under section 3-606.
The court recognized that the maker had a right of recourse dehors
the instrument but it held that a party's status as a surety must be
determined at the time he signs the instrument. It held that the party
had no rights under section 3-606.
Once again,1"' the decision in Commerce Union Bank appears to have
fallen into error because it failed to acknowledge that the sole,
statutory test is the existence of a right of recourse. The maker, unlike
the separate guarantors in the Provident Bank case, was a party to
the instrument and, as the court conceded, had a right of recourse
dehors the instrument. This being so, he met the statutory test under
section 3-606 and should have been discharged, notwithstanding the
fact that when he first signed, he was a sole maker without a right of
recourse.
108. An excellent analysis of this point is contained in Discharge of Sureties, supra
note 60, at 977 n.57. The footnote reads as follows:
The 1952 Official Draft referred only to a party's "right of recourse on the instrument." Pursuant to the 1956 Recommendations of the Permanent Editorial Board,

the words "on the instrument" were deleted in the 1957 Official Edition, and it was
explicitly pointed out in official comment 1 that the section discharged parties with
a right of recourse not only "on the instrument" but also "dehors it." The reason
was "to extend the suretyship defense of release of principal to cases of a principal
bound otherwise than on the instrument." American Law Institute and National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1956 Recommendations of
the Editorial Board For the Uniform Commercial Code 129 (1957). The Board indicated that the change was pursuant to the New York Law Revision Commission
comment that "It]he express provision of the Code about persons known to be subject to recourse on the instrument might be thought to create a negative inference,
i.e., that a release or extension, etc., given to a person not known to be subject to
recourse on the instrument would not effectuate a discharge." 2 New York Law
Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 1178-79 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as NYLRCR]. As pointed out by the Commission, it might not
cover a situation where a buyer purchases subject to a mortgage or even assumes a
mortgage without becoming a party to the instrument. 2 NYLRCR at 1178.
IM
109.
110.

503 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. 1973).
See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION

While Article 3 generally avoids use of suretyship terminology, section 3-606 delineates defenses of the types traditionally afforded to
sureties. The Code, properly construed, does not resort to the law of
suretyship to determine which parties are entitled to assert these
defenses, but it states instead its own standard consisting of but one
criterion: whether a person has a "right of recourse" against another.
Included within its scope as sureties, therefore, are not only the accommodation party and guarantor but also the indorser and even the comaker who possesses a right of contribution.
Unfortunately, most courts have failed to analyze the rights of parties under section 3-606 in terms of their possession of a right of
recourse but, instead, have held the parties up to supposed suretyship
criteria never mentioned in the Code. Even where the courts have
managed to reach the right ultimate results, they have left a plethora
of erroneous dicta which further confuses an already difficult area of
the law.
Confusion also has arisen over whether a party must sign the
negotiable instrument to be entitled to defenses under section 3-606.
The question should be answered in the affirmative but a split of
authority has begun to develop regarding the question.
This widespread confusion among courts regarding the identity of
sureties threatens to undermine the very uniformity on this question
which the Code is intended to foster. It is hoped that these problems
will be addressed when a revision of Article 3 is undertaken.

